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As we Americans study the real1tiea of our troubled
and disordered world, we fllUst recognize that conditions on this

e rth are not what they were when we were children.

Th• inter-

national situation following World War II bears veey little
resemblance to th t following the first world war.

Xn

fact, 1\

has no precedence in history.
We live in a changed world.. .I ts aapect,e ar-, unfamiliar

and, it must be admitted, somewhat fr1ght$ning.

We cannot :solve

the difficulties of today by leaning upon the precepts of the past.

History can help us some, but not IDUCh, as we seek an lntelligent
solution for the great twentieth century dilemma.
We must cut new p tterns.

New trails have to be blazecl.

We must writ$ our own history according to the demands ot the hour.
Amei-1cans n$ed not fear to face that necees:l.ty and to

act upon it.

Remember, Americans hav• always blazed new trails.

It is our tradition. We have looked upon the wilderness without fear,
and we have· &haped it to our need.a.

We have made new designs in

government, and found new ways to freedom. There is np need for
Amer1eans to le.an t<>o heavily upon old w ye.

Come what

ay,

Wt

can

afford full confidence that we will meet the challenge be:feire us •.

'l'he challenge Qt which I epe k. m~ans e. somewhat l'"evolutionary
change in our attitude toward national preparednese.
new

We must lea:rn

way or thinking on that &Ubject, :for our traditional attitude•

are .i nadequate if we are to play our role in the world (irama of our

time •

Americans have alw~ys responded with wholehearted enthusiasm
when an 1nternat1 onal c;r1si15 presented itself.

Unde~ the tl:lreati, of

aggression abroad . we have consistently and successfully ro~aed
ourselves to the military nee ssitiea dictated by each crisis.

Our

record in hi story is made glorious. by our national unity and the
rttsults we hav

~

chieved because of it,

It ls also twe, however,

th t when the cri$is has paesed, we have customarily sloughed otf
the burden of ltlilitary dtmands and returned rather abruptly to the

civ1li n world which we have learned to love eo dearly.

That is

only natural when you remember that our national characteristics
are dominated by peaceful thinking.
It is regr,e ttable, but only too true• that the world today
will :no longer lend it&$lf to such an attitude on the par't of
American citizens.

e ean no longer tace the military aituation on

the basis ot meeting a crisis as it ariees and then t'etir1ng into

peaceful pursuits without further thought ot war.

W~ must create

for ourselves o habit of penna.nent prepare(lness under wh.1ch we
shall be ready for war at any tlme and anywhere in the world.,

It now app ar probable that. real, permanent world pe ce
may be many decades in the future..
by

Since an anntstice was signed

Japan, we have seen little to indicate that genuine world peace

is an immediate posslb1l1ty.

In the last y ar or two, S.t would

$eem that p~ace, has been J>U$hed further into the tutu.re.

tension

aTe building up in

Dangerous

any areas of the world, and ueually,

ot course, 1n places where tb.e comntunista seek to spread their
godless, barbaric ideologies.
Thi

being the ease,. we must examine the situation £rankly

and we must realistically state our own role 1n

eeting the conditions.

To play th t role, we know now that we must have a plan for permanent
preparedness which will last tor: ,many., many years•- as far as we can

presently peer into the future ..

It must be a plan tor psrt1al

U'tobilization which can be turned into full JllObilizst1on almo•t :instantly.
This is a new concept. We have never b~fore been .taeed
With a need for partial mobilization.

Heretofor ., it has always

bean ttfee.st or famine." Fresh viewpoints and a frea,h approa(lh are
not only desirable, but absolutely mandatory.
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to

It ie

the shame 'Of our politicei.l leaders that the

American people have not yet been handed a complete plan embodying
such an approach,.

It is not the fault of the peple themselvts

that our stat

of prep. redness is not adequate ~o meet the threat

of communism .

You and I know that when the American oitiien ie

made fully aware of his role that he will fulfill it .
Let us think tor a few minutes

bout a plan for permanent

preparedne.ss. What shall 1t i nclude?

First ot all, we must plan on a global basis .

The old

expression "globaloney• invented by a w1tt;y femal• in Congress is
no longer funny .

The conception that national defense means ,

Americans, a way to "pro'tEict theae shores" fro
sufficient £or these ti.mes.

to

invasion 1s not

In the realistic vie:w. our frontiers

are the edges of the iron curtain wherever 1 t ha.s fallen aero.a s the

world.
It is discouraging, but it is a .f act th t the United States
st nds alone as a bulwark ag inst oofillnunism.

No other nation• •

indeed, no group of nations- - is i:repared to meet that threat.

Unless

America stands squarely .against the Kremlin, the KrelTilin will prev _il .

We cannot perm.it :iuch a catastrophe, and we will. not~
... It -

Our plan, therefore, should provide .for preparedness
on th

p rt of ev ry nation which tod y st nd$ in the path o:t

cotrununism.

lf th t

eans arm.lug them, then we must arm them just

e.s we would our own citizens against invading armies.

Am rica needs

the help of all men who will turn thei.r hands against coinmunism,
l'ilatever language they may apeak.

Along with a aound plan £or world•wide eQntailllllent Qf
communism• w~ need an adequate military pol1cy. a sound., firm,

foreign policy. an eff ctive method
d

or

psychological warfare i'or

home front strengthened by internals eurity.

mocraey, and

is th ae point

tor permanent preparedness th t I want u

It

to consider

t this time.
Th - pare.mount tnilitary issue
Korea.

ot

th

day ts the war in

We should win that war and b& done with it.

The t:ruce

negottations have dt'agged out for

o lQng that tb.e world finds it

d1f'f1cult to det rltline to whom th

victory belonge.

Mean11hile , the

coinmuniets are making use of the truce talks as a sounding board tor
their prop ganda . The talk

have .a ll the asp ct of a political

m_eting r ther than a m111t ry one.
It i

$

not a pretty sight to see Anituti~Em generals tied up

in apparently hopeless negotiations while our
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oldiers continue to

die every day in the fighting.

I think it ts more in th

American

tradition to wi:.:1 the battles and then di etate tbe peace terms.

· Perhaps it is too lat~ for tha.t now.

Our obligations to our

partners 1n the United Nations would not pend.ta c0tnplete reversal
of policy at this point.

eve;rthelees, I beli.eve that if' our

ailitary leader$ in Korea ar-e given fr&e reign• tbey will bring
the !igh:ting to

clos

on t rms acceptc. ble to the United Nations,

Failing that, they most certainly can rene'W the campaign and force

the enemy into -m il1ta.:ry submission.
A determined policy i s needed 1n Korea.

We have proof'

that such a policy will pay of£ in the fact that it took tour months

.to get Red China to agree to an arm.ietlc;:e line other than the 38th.

The Chinese had insisted all .along that they would not tattle for
anything else then tbe )8th pe.rallel., but they did. Without further

dallying,

n,d

Chinn should be put on notice that the talks will be

brought to _u end lf:itbln a given period or the .fighting will be
r$sumed. That is the ~nly realistic policy.
Although we have lost some face in Korea.,

"We

need not

feel too badly. The principal United Nat.ions objective, that 0£
halting the aggreasor and pushing him Qut

Qf

South Ko~&; has be$n

attained. During the negotiations, m1l1 tary aotion has been very
limited. Since .J une, 1950, we have had sol'J\ething ove.r 100,000

casualties, and of the 76,000 wounded only l, 700 have died,

This

is high tribute t ·o the effect! veneS.s of our rn•dical servic*' in

Korea, which has been outstanding.

In World War I, eight out of

1

very 100 wounded. d.ied; in World Wat- II 1 £our out ot every 100; in
the Korean war, two out or every 100.
50

Of those who are woundtJd,

csn go back into the line •.

The Korean fighting has demonetrattd graphieally our need
to build up a etirc;mg Air Fo:tee. We must look .forward to the eventual
d. velopment

or a force or 150 groups .. Military leader• now bell$Ve

that the present 95~group aim is too low, and; 1ndeed1 Air Force
Chief 0£,Staff G1:tnera1Vande~g has termed our present fore• a
"ehoe-string 11 Air Force in view of its glob l r eponsib1lit1es.

The

Strategic Aix:- Force is •till ;he wrld•s most po11erful military
instrument.

Nevertheless, the capacity of our Air Il'oroe to deliver

the atomic bonib is not keeping pace with atomlo development. Meanwhile.
the Russian

are out .. produ.cing

U.5

in aircraft,

General Vandenberg

h$& esti ated that it m.11 take the Yni ted States until 19SJ. to

match the Ruesians in the a.1r .

Nothing should btt allowed to et and

in t ht! way of this aircraft building program.
As to our ground forces, we are squarely aonfrOnted with

two choices:

e can maintain a large standing military eetabli~bment

over a long period of years, or we can institute a program or
universal military tr ining which will meke a large st nding army
unn ces-=»ary.
I

incerely believe th t the tremendous expense of

maintc.;.ining a large st"nding army over a long period would eventu lly
bring our nation to bankruptcy.

free nation for long.

An

insolvent nation cannot remain

On the other hand, an intelligent system

of universal military training would provide ab cklog of experienced

men which would guarantee the n tional. defense at . comp r tively
low cost.

Although the Congress has again rejected UMT, I still
believe we must eome to it _as the only logical way to protect America.
It is our best hope for

workable plan of permanent preparedness.

The young man reaching the ag

of 1g years today stands in gr ve

danger of h ving to risk his life in b ttle before he is 21.
1s the unfortunate fact.
where he

must not send him into battle untr ined--

ay perish in the early st ges of

not know the ropes.
in the past.

ght1ng bee u e he did

e have sent untrained men into b ttle

Universal

Th t

any times

ilit ry training is the best possible way

in which we can tr in our youth to protect them.selves and thereby
protect our

-00

try.
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To back up this plan, we must continue to strengthen
o-ur reserve components and to maintain them a.ta high degree of

eff1eiency, thus utilizing the brains and experience of the past,
he same careful attention and long-range planning ·must
be given to the development of an adequate Navy, equipped w.t.th the
finest ships and equipment. A $trong Navy may well become the means

of carrying the war to othe:r shores rather than fighting it on our
own soil. The saltte is true

or

the Marine Corps.

The best plan for permanent preparednes, from the strictly

tnilit ry viewpoint, entails powerful, alert striking forces from
the Army, the N vy. the Marines, and the Air Gorps, b eked up by

a deep well of r•s~rve strength in trained .-1 vilians.
There are several t; hing.s we oan do to help 'br1ng about
1;5uch an organization.

One o:f the most important is further inttgration

of the armed forces through the a.doptton of a single catalogue system.

There is much evidence of waste and duplication in th$buying for th•

Anned Forces. Competitive buying among the varl.ous units weakens the
economic strength of our nation, with an estimated ex,tr
five billions a year.

cost of

lt is not compatible with the philosophy of

unification of the 8.l"med services, and it ju.st doesn't me.lee sense.
fhe de-velopment of a.n adequate single catalogue
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ystem will cost much

money and great effort, but it will be worth it 1n time and me>ney
,f •

saved and in inereased efficiency, and it should be undertaken with

all possible speed.
A problem of prime importance in developing permanent
preparedness· is that of building a more adequate merchant marine.
Our merchant marine has recently been on the downgrade.

American ships carried 59% of our overseas trade.
c~rried only 38;6 of 1~.

In 1947

In J.950 thcey

Thie trend must be rtiversed 1£ we are to

be prepared for w.ur. Full priority for steel and other materie.ls
should be given to cur ship-building program.

In a military way we can look back upon a year of fairly
satisfactory progresih During the past year w

have add.ed more than

a. million men to our Armed Forces. We have added 28 wings to the

Air Force. 1ncre~$ed our army divisions and returned 270 Navy vessels
to active duty. We have reac~ed two billion dollars a month in

military delive:riesand construction, more than three times that of'
a year ago . While thet-e have been some cutbacks, the eiv11ian population
has not yet .felt them very much.

The g;oco~d gre t field of endeavor in working for permanent

preparedness is our goal of a firm, clear... cut foreign policy, We
still huve not developed

&

for,eipl policy that Americans c~n underttand

- 10 -

and 'believe in, and tmit the Russiane and their satellites will

respect.

Ther\3 io still some evidence 't hat we are going down the

cangerous road of ~p~asement.

At no time since the Korean war began has there been

greater need f.or a .f'irm pol1cy in Asia . The entire East i s a tinderbox
today. The French have their hands full in Indo-Ghina.

If the Reds

move in there. Indo-China might fall, Should that happen, tbe Red
tide in Burma, Thailand, and

a)ara might engulf the governments

of those lands, and the ltlhole of Southee:st Asia would be in Red. bands.
Jome foreign affairs experts believe this dangerous situation is
very much like that existing 'With tbe Japan•se be.fore Ptar-1 Barbor.
The time is late, but it is never too late to adopt a firm policy
in the East ,

We must find ways of showing the Russians that we are
determined to win world peace, but t.'1. .. t we realize our effort

muet

be be.eked up by a nation fully prepared to fight if necessary.

Too

often the Russians have succeeded in making our diplomata lose sight

of their long~range objectives, by harping on minor differences of
the moment .
In purauing this policy• we must take .full advanta.g

thee.aa1stance ottered by friendly nations. Such p&aples mutt be
• 11 •

of

brought into the fold of united action against comlllunism.

good illustration is the friendly attitude
have built air !ields,.

or

One

Turkey• where we

Turkey is strongly anti-comuniat.

Her

army numbers 400,000,all good fighters. Another illustration 1.$
Spain, whose port& the United 3tatee Sixth Fle~t r•oently visited

for the first tim.e· since 19,36.

Spain should be brought

tnto the

fo1d .
\\!'bile aiding fritmUy countries. we· must also tak·e ttrm

steps to withhold any kind ()f aseiet~nee from communist-nalnded
nation:t.

ln. some cases, Amen.can shipments of gocds have been

finding their way into Iron Curtain countries. Such shipments must

Finally, our foreign p9.licy should 1nclud.e continued
full support of the United Nations . Thie organ1r,at1on is not a wo~ld
govermnent, and not ev~n a sta~ toward one, Qs its relation~hips
are With aover-•1gn states and. it is restrsicted .f rom 1nvolvingU.:selt
with internal at.fairs..

I fimly believe. that the United Nations i.s

tbe greatest step ever taken by mankind toward the outlawing of war..
It has proved ita effectiveness in Korea, in Greece, and in other
parts 0£ the world, and we must continue to bolster it with our full
participation.
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"J.'he third point in our' permanent preparedness effort
should be n more ef'fecti ve psychological warfJii.re p'.rogram.. Thi -

p~gram, if' it

itJ

handled 1n a realistic a.nd iri.t~lllgent W"''Y, can

help to spread the concepts of democracy which are so vital in

combating coi:mm.utism. At this time our psychological program is too
weak tobe ef£ective.

ad.vantage of it.
alone.

Our e11emies know thist and they are taking

Russia is spending $40.000,000 a yee.r !or pamphlets

Other communi$t count:ries are spending from a hundred to six

hundred million dollars a year on propaganda. The communist
organization in France alone has an annual budget ol 150,000,000.
We nave :recently organized a Psychological .Strategy Board

for the purpose of working out long-range strategy. · This!$ a step
in the right d.i rection; for it unifies the efforts of the St.a te

Department, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence
Agency.

We must a,ll democracy througnout the world, for it is the
best answer to communism.
Our final aim in laying down a plan for permanent preparedness
should be th~ maintenance 0£ a unified home fr.o nt backed by a .sound

nation~l econo~y.
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To accomplish this purpose• non-eaaent1al. :~on-deiens&
e penditures must be kept to an absolute minimum. This year the
Congress we$ ,u1ked to appropriate e1gbty...f1ve billion dollars.
presumably becs.u~e of j.ncriased rnilit~y spending.

experts tell

~

that the bill al.so represent$

8Jl

However 1 finanei·a l

iner~as~ of ten

billions tor non-d.e.fense purpos-es. That is. a dangerous request 1n

these tiees. We are ;rapi ly approaching the day wbtn we Will be
apending ourselves out ot businees . Senator Harry F. Byrd, of
Virgini a, one of the nation's greatest experts in fiscal policy.

says the finE;1n~ial peril confronting us is
war itself.

s great az, the tlu-eat of

Be b&lievatl that from Six to eight billions in non-

ess,ntial spend.i11g can be. eliminated.; and his effort to eliminate
it should have the eupport ot all loyal Americana .•

Along with a sound fiscal Policy, we must have e.11 .... out
indust.r ial p.roduet1on tor our defense needs, carrying with it priority

allocations of critical materials strictly aligned with the prepartd•
ness program .

Our vast industrial pot,e ntial, which meant. eo mu.ch

in World War II, muet be utilized to the gl'"f!atest Possible e:xtent.
Already, industry is gearing itself tor a long-range

program to meet rn:ll:it ry requirements. The milit ry consumed 12% of
the gross national product l ast year, and nll probably consume 1~

of the national product in 1952# which means a $ii•able gtiin.
ind . try expands to meet the reqairements, the advi.aability

At

ot

Qecentralization should always be kept in mind; not only from the
"5tandpoint 0£ possible attack from the air, but to equaltze the
burden of production throughout trie country.
ii thin industry and ine;ide our gov~rnment ci.rol$s • we

must be eternally vigilant in keepin

infiltration.

down the threat of communist

In r•ce11t years we have made some etrides in exposing

the communists who have sometimes penetrated to th$ most e~cret
pl· ces of our national lif'e. Th.is effort must continue unabated,

e-l se we may wake up one day to. find alien hande at our ven vitals.
Finally, in building our design £or internal s curity 1
we must develop an a.dequ.a te pn:,g,ram of' c::L'Vilinn defense for critical

a:reas.

Needl · ea to say,. this e.ff"ort may vary con!fiderably from one

community to another.

all is needed.

Some communities may .feel that no et.fort at

Others, finding themselves locattd in the vicinity

of vulne.r able Jtlilitary install tions or vast industrial developments.

ahould. work out an integr-ated plan so that every cttizen will know
what to do

nd ho

to do it in the event 0£ an enemy attack.

We cannot overlook tht! PQSeibility or nn stotnic attack,

and eYen a succ.ess.fu.l one. The Ch1ef of our Ai:r Force has said that
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at lea.st 70%

or

an ~ttacking force could penet:r te our ail'" deten$es .

Th t mt>an$ at·o mic bombs could be dropped ·On our eities in spite of
the efforts of' our air· screen.

Knowing this

r aet.,

Amer! cans cannot

fail to ;repare them.selves.

There we have it•- a four-pronged plan tor permanent
peeparednes$, an ad~quate military e ta.blishment; a firm foreign

policy; an effectivepsyehologieal warfare program; and a sound
11ational eeon9my me.king tor internal security.
We can accomplish this aim Without 'becoming a militartetio

nation.

There is no need to fear that the merican citizen, 'Who

io a nian of peaceful _pureui.ts. \'fill be converted in'ti() an aggressive

military type . Americ~..ns are too straight-forward in their thinking
to allow sueh a thing to come about .

It 1s, after all, a responsibility of the Arttertcan eit.i zen.

Knowing him as l believe l do, I have every f;i.ith in his ability to
dt!end h1a country and to stop the onslaught of c01m11unism whetiever

h& meets it th~oughout the world •
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